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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
                     
 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
 
 Creditor California Federal Bank ("CalFed"), holder of 
a first mortgage against the debtor partnership's primary asset 
("the property"), seeks relief from the automatic stay in a 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding in order to initiate foreclosure 
proceedings.0  Nantucket Investors II ("Nantucket Investors"), 
who holds a second mortgage against the property, opposes the 
lifting of the stay.   
 The bankruptcy court granted CalFed relief from the 
stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1), finding that CalFed's interest 
in the property was not being adequately protected during the 
pendency of the bankruptcy proceedings.  The district court 
reversed, finding that CalFed's current claim, having been 
reduced by post-petition payments, was less than the bankruptcy 
court had determined and was adequately protected.  The district 
court also found that the debtor retained equity in the property 
and that relief from the automatic stay would therefore be 
unavailable under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) as well.0   We will 
                                                           
0
 Following the district court's disposition of this 
matter, CalFed assigned its claim to Argo Loan Limited 
Partnership who was substituted as the named appellant in this 
matter.  For ease of discussion, we will refer to both CalFed and 
Argo Loan Limited Partnership as CalFed. 
0
 The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1334(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1)-(2), which confers 
4 
reverse the order of the district court and remand with 
instructions to return this matter to the bankruptcy court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.   
 
I. 
 Indian Palms Associates, the debtor partnership, was 
formed to acquire a 176-unit garden apartment complex located in 
Florida.  The debtor purchased that property from Nantucket 
Investors in 1983, and it is the debtor's primary asset.  In 1984 
the debtor executed a promissory note of $3.9 million in favor of 
CalFed, and a mortgage and security agreement to secure payment 
of the note.  Pursuant to the mortgage and note, CalFed also 
received an assignment of the property's leases, rents, and 
income. 
 On December 13, 1990, the debtor filed for relief under 
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, triggering the automatic stay 
imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).  At that time, CalFed held a first 
mortgage against the property, which, with accrued interest and 
late charges, totalled approximately $4.5 million.  Nantucket 
Investors held a second mortgage on the property of approximately 
$500,000, and a third mortgage was held by FEC Mortgage Company 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
jurisdiction over core proceedings arising under Title 11, 
including a motion for relief from the automatic stay.  The 
district court had jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from the 
bankruptcy court's granting of relief from the stay pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 158(a).  This court has jurisdiction to entertain the 
instant appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) as the district 
court entered a final order reversing the bankruptcy court's 
order.  CalFed filed a timely notice of appeal following the 
district court's denial of its motion for rehearing.  See Fed. R. 
App. P. 6(b)(2)(i). 
5 
("FEC") in the amount of $1.6 million.  FEC was, and remains, an 
affiliate of the debtor.  At the time of the bankruptcy filing, 
there was also a property tax lien against the property of 
between $92,000 and $300,000.0  The parties agree that the tax 
lien has priority over CalFed's first mortgage.  At the time of 
the bankruptcy filing, the value of the property was between 
$4.65 and $5.25 million. 
 During the course of the bankruptcy proceedings, the 
debtor filed a series of plans of reorganization which were not 
confirmed.  CalFed consented to both the second and third amended 
plans, but the debtor withdrew the third amended plan when CalFed 
refused to agree to certain amendments that were necessary to 
ensure the plan's confirmation.  CalFed then moved for relief 
from the automatic stay under sections 362(d)(1) and (d)(2) of 
the Bankruptcy Code so that it could institute foreclosure 
proceedings against the property.  In opposition to that motion, 
the debtor submitted a letter memorandum with a proposed fourth 
amended plan of reorganization. 
 The debtor's fourth amended plan proposed the 
following: (1) the continuance of CalFed's lien on the property 
in the full amount of its claim with annual interest payments 
based on an interest rate of 7.75%, plus payments of excess cash 
flow after the first two years, and a balloon payment for the 
                                                           
0
 The debtor's Disclosure Statement of Financial Affairs 
indicated that the tax liens at the time of the bankruptcy filing 
were $92,000, but the district court noted that material in the 
record suggested that tax liens as of the filing date could have 
been as high as $300,000. 
6 
remaining mortgage balance five years after confirmation, (2) the 
payment in full of all real estate taxes and arrearages, (3) an 
initial $50,000 payment to Nantucket Investors on its second 
mortgage with various payments to follow, and (4) the infusion of 
$425,000 in new capital by the debtor's partners for capital 
improvements on and maintenance of the property. 
 The bankruptcy court held a hearing on CalFed's motion 
to vacate the stay.  At the hearing, Nantucket Investors joined 
the debtor in actively opposing the proposed lifting of the stay. 
The bankruptcy court granted CalFed's motion.  In its oral 
ruling, the bankruptcy court explained that the debtor had failed 
to show that CalFed's interest in the property was adequately 
protected because the value of the property had been steadily 
declining since the bankruptcy petition was filed and the debtor 
had submitted no evidence to demonstrate that the value would not 
continue to decline if the stay were not lifted.  The bankruptcy 
court thus found that the lifting of the stay could be granted 
under section 362(d)(1) which provides that "the court shall 
grant relief from the [automatic] stay . . . for cause, including 
the lack of adequate protection of an interest in property of 
such party in interest."  11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1). 
 Based on what it understood to be a concession by the 
debtor, the bankruptcy court determined that the $1.1 million in 
post-petition payments made by the debtor to CalFed had been 
interest payments rather than payments on the principal debt. 
Thus, in reaching the conclusion that CalFed was inadequately 
protected, the bankruptcy court did not reduce the principal debt 
7 
by the amount of these post-petition payments and concluded that 
CalFed was owed just over $4.5 million.  As a result, the 
debtor's secured indebtedness to CalFed was found to be slightly 
greater than the property's value at the time of the hearing, 
which was stipulated to be $4.5 million. 
 The bankruptcy court's discussion of the liens 
outstanding against the property led to an implicit finding that 
the total liens exceeded the current stipulated value of the 
property and that the debtor therefore had no equity in the 
property -- a factor supporting relief from the stay under 
section 362(d)(2).  Although the court noted that its resolution 
of the issues under section 362(d)(1) meant that it need not 
consider the factors necessary for relief from the stay under 
section 362(d)(2), the court went on to discuss the second 
section 362(d)(2) factor -- whether the property is necessary to 
an effective reorganization.  The court concluded that the 
proposed fourth plan would not be confirmable without CalFed's 
consent because it improperly extended the original maturity date 
of CalFed's loan.  According to the bankruptcy court, section 
362(d)(2) thus provided an alternate basis for granting relief 
from the automatic stay.  The court entered an order lifting the 
stay and allowing CalFed to institute a foreclosure action 
against the debtor.   
 Nantucket Investors appealed to the district court.0 
Thereafter, CalFed filed a motion to strike certain documents 
                                                           
0
 The debtor did not participate in that appeal and is 
not participating in the appeal to this court.   
8 
that Nantucket Investors had designated as part of the record on 
appeal.  The district court denied CalFed's motion to strike the 
documents and reversed the bankruptcy court's order lifting the 
stay.  
 With respect to CalFed's motion to strike, the district 
court concluded that the documents, while not submitted to or 
reviewed by the bankruptcy court, had all been filed with the 
bankruptcy court as part of the debtor's Chapter 11 proceeding, 
and were therefore part of the bankruptcy court record.  The 
district court found it immaterial whether the bankruptcy court 
had actually considered any of these documents because they had 
all been available to the bankruptcy court for its consideration. 
As to Nantucket's appeal, the district court found clearly 
erroneous the bankruptcy court's finding of an agreement among 
the parties that the post-petition payments of $1.1 million 
represented interest payments.  First, the district court noted 
that the debtor had argued to the contrary in the hearing before 
the bankruptcy court.0  Second, the district court determined 
that of the $1.1 million post-petition payments made by the 
                                                           
0
 Counsel for the debtor had stated that it did not 
concede that the post-petition payments represented payments of 
interest, and argued that they were payments on the aggregate 
debt owed.  App. 326.  However, in its letter memorandum to the 
bankruptcy court in opposition to CalFed's motion for relief from 
the stay, the debtor noted that in the proposed fourth plan it 
elected not to apply the post-petition payments to reduce its 
outstanding indebtedness to CalFed.  App. 296.  The bankruptcy 
court apparently understood the debtor's position to be that the 
post-petition payments were not to be applied against the 
principal portion of CalFed's lien.  At the hearing, CalFed 
argued that the payments represented interest or were in the 
nature of adequate protection payments.  App. 327-28.   
 
9 
debtor to CalFed, at least $955,000 should have been attributed 
to payments on principal rather than interest.  Relying on United 
States Savings Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest 
Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365 (1988), the district court concluded 
that section 506(b) of the Bankruptcy Code limits post-petition 
interest to oversecured claims and only to the extent of their 
oversecurity at the time the bankruptcy petition is filed.0 Based 
on the parties's appraisals, the district court estimated that 
the value of the property at the time of filing was approximately 
$4.75 million.  It further found that CalFed's claim at that time 
was approximately $4.513 million subordinated to tax liens of 
$92,000.00.0  As a result, CalFed was only oversecured by 
approximately $145,000 and thus, under 11 U.S.C.  
                                                           
0
 The Bankruptcy Code does not speak of secured and 
unsecured creditors, but of allowed secured and unsecured claims. 
11 U.S.C. § 506(a).  An allowed claim is secured to the extent 
the value of the collateral equals the claim.  To the extent a 
claim exceeds the value of the collateral securing it, it becomes 
an unsecured claim in the bankruptcy case.  Thus, an undersecured 
claim becomes bifurcated under § 506(a) into two claims, one 
secured and one unsecured.  Because the bankruptcy court 
concluded that CalFed's claim was oversecured, its claim was 
considered a fully secured claim for purposes of determining the 
accrual of interest under § 506(b). 
0
 The parties disputed the value of the property on the 
date the bankruptcy petition was filed.  The earliest appraisal 
presented to the bankruptcy court set the value of the property 
at $4.65 million as of June 1, 1991.  The debtor also had an 
appraisal showing the value of the property to be $5.2 million as 
of July 1991, although the debtor indicated that that appraisal 
had been revised to $4.9 million three months later.  App. 330-
33.  The district court used the compromise figure of $4.75 
million to represent the value of the property at the time of 
filing, and also used $92,000 as the filing date tax lien figure, 
although the evidence indicated that figure might have been 
higher.  See supra note 3.  The court noted that on remand the 
bankruptcy court was free to make more accurate findings as to 
the value of the property and the amount of the tax lien on the 
10 
§ 506(b), the full $1.1 million in post-petition payments could 
not have represented payments on interest.  Rather, at most, only 
$145,000 of the post-petition payments were payments of interest. 
Allocating the balance of these payments to payments on principal 
left CalFed with a claim of approximately $3.558 million. 
Comparing this figure to the current value of the property (which 
for purposes of this motion the parties stipulated to be $4.5 
million), less the outstanding value of the senior tax lien 
($250,000), left CalFed with a $700,000 "equity cushion."  The 
district court determined that this difference was sufficient to 
protect CalFed's interest, and held that CalFed was therefore not 
entitled to relief under section 362(d)(1). 
 The district court went on to determine whether relief 
could be granted under section 362(d)(2).  The district court 
rejected the bankruptcy court's implicit comparison between the 
value of the property and the total liens against the property, 
and accepted Nantucket Investors's argument that only the 
difference between CalFed's claim and the property's current 
value (less the current value of the senior tax lien) should be 
considered.  This left the debtor with an equity interest worth 
approximately $700,000.  The court found this analysis 
appropriate under the circumstances because both junior lien 
holders, Nantucket Investors and the debtor's affiliate FEC, 
opposed the lifting of the stay and were willing to accept under 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
filing date, but concluded that the outcome of its calculations 
would not change even if figures more generous to CalFed's 
position were used. 
11 
the fourth plan of reorganization a drastic impairment of their 
claims, which the court found had the effect of increasing the 
debtor's interest in the property.0  The district court found it 
equitable under these circumstances to disregard their claims in 
determining whether the debtor had equity in the property.  The 
district court thus found that the stay could not be lifted under 
section 362(d)(2).   
 The district court also reached the issue whether the 
property was necessary to an effective reorganization, the second 
prerequisite to the granting of relief under section 362(d)(2). 
It rejected the bankruptcy court's view that a "cram down" which 
extended the terms of a mortgage was unreasonable as a matter of 
law.  The district court stated that, if its ruling on the 
existence of equity were reversed on appeal, the matter should be 
remanded to the bankruptcy court for a determination as to 
whether the debtor had proposed an effective reorganization such 
                                                           
0
 The debtor and Nantucket testified before the 
bankruptcy court regarding modifications to the fourth plan to 
which the creditors had recently agreed.  Under the revised 
fourth plan, Nantucket would get a payment of $50,000 upon 
confirmation of the plan, and a $150,000 lien which would accrue 
interest at the rate of 8%, would be paid in full in five years, 
and would be subordinated to CalFed's claim and the tax lien. The 
balance of its claim, $350,000, would accrue at 8% and would be 
subordinated to the debtor's limited partners receiving four 
times its investment capital of $425,000.  App. 342-43.  The FEC 
mortgage, held by the debtor's general partner, would be 
subordinated to all other claims, including the unsecured claims 
and the equity interest holders receiving ten times the value of 
their $425,000 new capital infusion.  App. 343.  The tax lien, 
which had been converted to a tax certificate and sold to another 
party with whom the debtor negotiated a reduction in interest, 
would be reduced from $300,000 to $250,000 and accrue interest at 
the negotiated rate of 10% instead of at the former 18% interest 
rate. 
12 
that relief under § 362(d)(2) would be foreclosed.  The district 
court entered an order remanding to the bankruptcy court for 
entry of an order denying CalFed's motion and for further 
proceedings consistent with its opinion.  The "further 
proceedings" apparently referred to the bankruptcy court's 
ability to determine the actual amount of the tax liens and the 
actual value of the property as of the filing date.  See supra 
note 7.  CalFed filed a motion for rehearing, which the district 
court, in an unpublished opinion, denied.  CalFed filed a timely 




  Argo Loan Limited Partnership, as assignee of 
CalFed's claim, raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the 
district court erred in denying CalFed's motion to strike 
documents not presented to or considered by the bankruptcy court 
in connection with CalFed's motion to lift the stay; (2) whether 
the district court erred in determining that the debtor had 
equity in the property for purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2)(A), 
and (3) whether the district court exceeded its scope of 
appellate review by making factual findings with regard to the 
proper allocation of the $1.1 million post-petition payments.  We 
review the bankruptcy court's factual findings under the clearly 
erroneous standard.  Landon v. Hunt, 977 F.2d 829, 840 (3d Cir. 
1992); Resyn Corp. v. United States, 851 F.2d 660, 664 (3d Cir. 
1988).  The district court's and the bankruptcy court's legal 
13 
conclusions are subject to plenary review.  In re Sharon Steel 
Corp., 871 F.2d 1217 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 We conclude that CalFed's motion to strike was properly 
denied because the documents which CalFed sought to strike from 
the appellate record, having been filed in the bankruptcy case 
record, were part of the relevant record in this contested 
matter.  However, we disagree with the district court's 
application of the standards for determining the debtor's equity 
in the property and conclude that the debtor did not have equity 
in the property under the correct legal standard.  We will 
therefore reverse and remand so that the bankruptcy court may 
determine whether relief from the automatic stay should be 
granted under section 362(d)(2).  We also conclude that the 
district court did not engage in any impermissible factfinding in 
determining the proper allocation of the post-petition payments, 




 In relevant part, the current version0 of Bankruptcy 
Rule 8006 provides: 
 
 Within 10 days after filing the notice 
of appeal . . . the appellant shall file with 
the clerk [of the bankruptcy court] and serve 
on the appellee a designation of the items to 
                                                           
0
 Subsequent to the district court's disposition of this 
appeal, Bankruptcy Rule 8006 was amended, but the changes 
relevant to this appeal were stylistic only.  See Fed. R. Bankr. 
P. 8006 advisory committee's note (1994 amendment). 
14 
be included in the record on appeal and a 
statement of the issues to be presented. 
Within 10 days after the service of the 
appellant's statement the appellee may file 
and serve on the appellant a designation of 
additional items to be included in the record 
on appeal and, if the appellee has filed a 
cross appeal, the appellee as cross appellant 
shall file and serve a statement of the 
issues to be presented on the cross appeal 
and a designation of additional items to be 
included in the record.  A cross appellee 
may, within 10 days of service of the cross 
appellant's statement, file and serve on the 
cross appellant a designation of additional 
items to be included in the record.  The 
record on appeal shall include the items so 
designated by the parties, the notice of 
appeal, the judgment, order, or decree 
appealed from, and any opinion, findings of 
fact, and conclusions of law of the court. 
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8006 (emphasis added).  Pursuant to Bankruptcy 
Rule 8006, Nantucket Investors designated as part of the record 
on appeal fourteen documents that CalFed promptly moved to 
strike.  These included the Chapter 11 petition, the debtor's 
statement of financial affairs and schedules, the debtor's second 
and third amended plans and disclosure statements, a prior motion 
of CalFed to lift the automatic stay, and a number of briefs with 
accompanying certifications that had been filed in the bankruptcy 
case.  
 In its motion to strike these documents from the 
appellate record, CalFed took the position that these fourteen 
documents could not be properly designated under Rule 8006 
because they had not been submitted to the bankruptcy court for 
its consideration in connection with the instant motion to lift 
the stay.  The district court declined to strike the documents. 
15 
It subsequently relied upon some of these documents for the 
purpose of showing the position CalFed took before the bankruptcy 
court in connection with a prior motion to lift the stay.0  It 
did not use any of these documents for any other purpose. 
Notably, it did not, for example, look to the debtor's statement 
of affairs and schedules for the purpose of establishing the 
value of assets at the time of filing.  Rather, the district 
court remanded for the purpose of having the bankruptcy court 
consider this and other similar matters. 
 The issue thus presented is whether a party designating 
the record on appeal under Bankruptcy Rule 8006 can draw only 
from the record created in connection with the motion that 
initiated a contested matter0 or whether that party can draw from 
the record of the bankruptcy case. 
                                                           
0
 This was relevant in the context of a waiver issue. See 
infra part VI.   
0
 Disputes litigated in the bankruptcy court are divided 
into adversary proceedings and contested matters.  Ten types of 
disputes are designated as adversary proceedings in Bankruptcy 
Rule 7001.  These include most proceedings to recover money or 
property (including recoveries under the trustee's avoiding 
powers); proceedings to determine the validity, priority, or 
extent of a lien; proceedings to determine the dischargeability 
of a debt; proceedings to revoke a confirmed plan of 
reorganization; proceedings to determine a claim or cause of 
action removed to the bankruptcy court; and others.  Adversary 
proceedings are governed by more formal rules of procedure than 
contested matters and must be instituted by the filing of a 
complaint.  Pursuant to Chapter VII of the Bankruptcy Rules, many 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are applicable and these 
proceedings are thus conducted much like ordinary civil 
litigation. 
 Other disputes that arise in connection with the 
bankruptcy case, including requests for relief from the automatic 
stay, are contested matters.  See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9014 advisory 
committee note (1983 adoption) (a contested matter is "an actual 
dispute, other than an adversary proceeding, before the 
16 
 We have previously held that a bankruptcy judge 
deciding an adversary proceeding, which is an independent 
litigation, and an appellate court reviewing that decision, 
cannot properly use documents filed only in the underlying 
bankruptcy case unless that use can be justified under the 
judicial notice doctrine.  In re Aughenbaugh, 125 F.2d 887, 889 
(3d Cir. 1942).0  The district court in this case regarded this 
contested matter to be sufficiently associated with the general 
administration of the debtor's estate that the relevant record 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
bankruptcy court").  They are generally initiated by motion and 
do not require a responsive pleading (unless the bankruptcy court 
directs that an answer be served).  Only certain of the rules 
governing adversary proceedings apply to the resolution of 
contested matters and the court may direct that these rules will 
not apply in the litigation of a particular contested matter or 
that other rules will apply.  See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9014.  The 
procedures governing contested matters are thus less formal. 
0
 We held in that case that in determining the issue of 
insolvency in an action by the trustee to avoid a transfer as a 
preference, the referee could not rely on the bankruptcy 
schedules, official appraisals, proofs of claims, and other items 
on file in the bankruptcy case when they had not been introduced 
into evidence in the trustee's preference action.  In re 
Aughenbaugh, 125 F.2d at 890.  We stated: 
 
If the trustee desired to rely upon any 
papers already on file in the bankruptcy 
proceeding it was incumbent upon him to offer 
them at the hearing of his exceptions in 
order that the mortgagee might know that they 
were being ruled upon and might have an 
opportunity to meet them with such other 
evidence as might be available to it. 
 
Id. at 889.  We noted further that the doctrine of judicial 
notice did not provide a basis for the referee's use of the 
challenged documents in that case.  Id. at 890 ("[T]he facts to 
which [the previously filed documents] related, being disputed in 
the very controversy under consideration, were not the sort of 
facts of which the referee was entitled to take judicial 
notice."). 
17 
should include the case file as well as the documents submitted 
in connection with the motion to lift the stay.  We, and most of 
the courts that have heretofore considered the matter, agree. 
See, e.g., In re Chateaugay Corp., 64 B.R. 990, 995 (S.D.N.Y. 
1986); In re T. Michaelis Corvette Supplies, Inc., 14 B.R. 365, 
367 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981); Saco Local Dev. Corp. v. Armstrong 
(In re Saco Local Dev. Corp.), 13 B.R. 226, 229-30 (Bankr. D. Me. 
1981). 
 We hasten to add that the fact that a document is 
included in the relevant record does not mean that the bankruptcy 
judge, or the reviewing district court judge, is entitled to use 
it for any purpose.  Just as with documents in the record of a 
civil action filed in a district court, there are principles that 
limit its use. 
 One limitation is the rule that each litigant should be 
given a fair opportunity to rebut and put into perspective the 
evidence admitted against its position.  It is understood, for 
example, that the facts relating to the merits of the case will 
be decided on the basis of evidence admitted into the trial 
record.  Andrews v. Bechtel Power Corp., 780 F.2d 124, 142 (1st 
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1172 (1986).  Thus, for 
example, an admission of a party previously made in the record 
should normally be tendered and admitted into evidence at the 
trial, before the judge in a bench trial can use it to resolve 
the factual merits of the case. 
 Another limitation is the rule requiring evidentiary 
competence.  Under this rule, a document cannot be put to a 
18 
hearsay use for most purposes, and for this reason, a previously 
filed court document will generally not be competent evidence of 
the truth of the matters asserted therein. 
 Neither of these limitations means, however, that when 
the course and timing of proceedings, or the positions previously 
taken by the parties in the case, become relevant for any reason, 
a trial or appellate judge may not look to any document in the 
case record to establish the relevant fact.  Documents in the 
case record will be relevant to many issues, including waiver, 
estoppel, preservation of an issue for appeal, the fact and 
length of litigation delay, limitations issues, prejudice to an 
opposing party, and the like.  The use of documents in the case 
record for such purposes does not offend the limitations 
discussed above because the documents are not being used to 
determine disputed facts relating to the merits of the case and 
their use thus does not impose on a party's ability to meet the 
evidence against it.  Similarly, it is not seriously questioned 
that the filing of documents in the case record provides 
competent evidence of certain facts -- that a specific document 
was filed, that a party took a certain position, that certain 
judicial findings, allegations, or admissions were made.  See In 
re Bestway Prods., 151 B.R. 530, 540-41 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1993), 
aff'd, 165 B.R. 339 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1994), and aff'd sub nom. In 
re Wetherbee, 165 B.R. 339 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1994). 
 Here the district court properly looked to the record 
of the underlying bankruptcy case.  Documents outside the record 
developed on CalFed's lift stay motion were used for the sole 
19 
purpose of determining whether CalFed had waived an argument it 
sought to make in its motion for reconsideration.  This purpose 
comports with the rules we have discussed. 
 Even if we were to accept CalFed's view of the limited 
source from which a party may designate the record under 
Bankruptcy Rule 8006, however, we could not fault the district 
court in denying CalFed's motion to strike.  Nantucket Investors 
argues that the doctrine of judicial notice provides an 
additional basis on which to affirm the district court's denial 
of CalFed's motion to strike.  Federal Rule of Evidence 201 
authorizes a court to take judicial notice of an adjudicative 
fact if that fact is "not subject to reasonable dispute."  Fed. 
R. Evid. 201(b).  "Judicial notice may be taken at any stage of 
the proceeding," Fed. R. Evid. 201(f), including on appeal, id. 
advisory committee's note (1972 proposed rules), as long as it is 
not unfair to a party to do so and does not undermine the trial 
court's factfinding authority.  Charles Alan Wright & Kenneth W. 
Graham, 21 Federal Practice and Procedure, § 5110, at 525 (1977); 
cf. Zell v. Jacoby-Bender, Inc., 542 F.2d 34, 38 (7th Cir. 1976) 
(refusing to take judicial notice of documents filed in companion 
case to undermine trial court's findings where to do so would 
violate rule that appellate court must consider only record 
before the trial court and exception for "new developments" was 
not met). 
 Nantucket Investors' designation of the appellate 
record can be viewed as a request that the district court take 
judicial notice of certain portions of the record in the 
20 
underlying bankruptcy case.  When so viewed, we think the 
district court's response to CalFed's motion to strike was 
authorized by Federal Rule of Evidence 201.0  See, e.g., Job v. 
Calder (In re Calder), 907 F.2d 953, 955 n.2 (10th Cir. 1990) 
(upholding bankruptcy court's taking judicial notice of omissions 
in debtor's previously filed statement of affairs and schedule of 
assets as evidence that debtor had made a false oath); In re 
Strathatos, 163 B.R. 83 (N.D. Tex. 1993) (taking judicial notice 
of bankruptcy court's findings of facts). 
 
IV. 
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 The district court's use of the challenged documents 
conformed to the standards for judicial notice because the 
noticed facts were facts not subject to reasonable dispute and 
CalFed was given an opportunity to be heard.  See Fed. R. Evid. 
201(e) (upon request a party must be given an opportunity to be 
heard regarding both the propriety of taking judicial notice and 
the "tenor" of the matter noticed).  In light of the fact that 
the court may take judicial notice of adjudicative facts on its 
own initiative, the Rule provides that the opportunity to be 
heard may occur after judicial notice has been taken.  Fed. R. 
Evid. 201(e); see also id. advisory committee's note (1972 
proposed rules) ("No formal scheme of giving notice is provided. 
An adversely affected party may learn in advance that judicial 
notice is in contemplation . . . [o]r he may have no advance 
notice at all.").  CalFed had an opportunity to oppose the 
propriety of the district court's consideration of these 
documents, and in fact did so, by filing its motion to strike the 
documents and by presenting argument in support of that motion to 
the district court.  Moreover, Nantucket Investors argued in its 
brief to this court that judicial notice provided an alternative 
basis on which to affirm the district court's denial of CalFed's 
motion to strike.  Thus, CalFed had the opportunity to address 
before us the propriety of the district court's taking judicial 
notice of these documents.  Accordingly, the failure of the 
district court to give CalFed an opportunity to oppose the taking 
of judicial notice is at worst a harmless error. 
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 When a debtor files for protection under Chapter 11 of 
the Bankruptcy Code, section 362(a) provides an automatic stay of 
most actions against the debtor's property, including actions to 
realize the value of collateral securing an obligation of the 
debtor.  11 U.S.C. § 362(a).  Because a secured creditor risks 
losing the benefit of its security interest if it is unable to 
foreclose against the property, the Bankruptcy Code permits a 
creditor to seek such relief by filing a motion for relief from 
the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d).  That section 
provides: 
 
On request of a party in interest and after 
notice and a hearing, the court shall grant 
relief from the [automatic] stay . . ., such 
as by terminating, annulling, modifying, or 
conditioning such stay-- 
 
(1) for cause, including the lack of 
adequate protection of an interest in 
property of such party in interest; or 
 
(2) with respect to a stay of an act against 
property under subsection (a) of this 
section, if-- 
 
(A) the debtor does not have 
an equity in such 
property; and 
 
(B) such property is not 
necessary to an effective 
reorganization. 
Section 362(d) is thus intended to balance the interests of the 
creditors and the debtor. 
 CalFed sought relief from the automatic stay under both 
subsections (d)(1) and (d)(2) of section 362(d).  We first review 
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the district court's conclusion that the debtor retained equity 
in the property.  We conclude that the district court committed 
an error of law. 
 
A. 
 The classic test for determining equity under section 
362(d)(2) focuses on a comparison between the total liens against 
the property and the property's current value.  Stewart v. 
Gurley, 745 F.2d 1194, 1195 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing cases); In re 
Hanley, 102 B.R. 36, 37 (W.D. Pa. 1989); In re Colonial Ctr., 
Inc., 156 B.R. 452, 460 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993); La Jolla Mortg. 
Fund v. Rancho El Cajon Assocs., 18 B.R. 283, 290 (Bankr. S.D. 
Calif. 1982); State Employee Retirement Fund v. Gardner (In re 
Gardner), 14 B.R. 455, 456 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981); North East 
Fed. Savs. & Loan Assoc. v. Mikole Devels., Inc. (In re Mikole 
Devels., Inc.), 14 B.R. 524, 524 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981).  "All 
encumbrances are totalled to determine equity whether or not all 
lienholders have requested relief from the stay."  Nazareth Nat'l 
Bank & Trust Co. v. Trina-Dee, Inc. (In re Trina-Dee, Inc.), 26 
B.R. 152, 154 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd, 731 F.2d 170 (3d 
Cir. 1984).  The district court chose not to apply this formula, 
finding it appropriate under the circumstances to exclude 
consideration of the junior secured claims held by Nantucket and 
FEC.  Nantucket Investors argues that the district court properly 
excluded the interests of it and FEC because both agreed to 
compromise their interests in a subordination agreement in order 
23 
to avoid foreclosure.0  We find that the following factors weigh 
against Nantucket Investors' position: (1) the plain language of 
section 362(d)(2)(A); (2) the legislative history and policies 
behind the Bankruptcy Code; and (3) the fact that the Code 
provides other means by which the interests of junior lienholders 
may be protected. 
 
B. 
 The Bankruptcy Code does not define the term "equity" 
in section 362(d)(2)(A) or in any other section.  Nor does the 
legislative history shine any direct light on the intended 
meaning of this term.  When Congress enacted the present-day 
Bankruptcy Code, however, the generally understood meaning of 
equity interest was the value of a property above all secured 
liens.  See Black's Law Dictionary 634 (4th ed. 1968) (defining 
equity for purposes of real estate transactions as: "The 
remaining interest belonging to one who has pledged or mortgaged 
his property, or the surplus of value which may remain after the 
property has been disposed of for the satisfaction of liens.  The 
amount or value of a property above the total liens or 
charges.").  We must assume that Congress was cognizant of this 
traditional meaning when it enacted section 362(d)(2)(A) without 
                                                           
0
 The treatment of the junior lienholders' claims under 
the proposed fourth plan is discussed supra note 8.  We do not 
question the propriety or enforceability of the subordination 
agreements involving Nantucket Investors' and FEC's claims, 11 
U.S.C. § 510(a); we simply reject the argument that the 
subordination agreements can be used to determine the debtor's 
equity interest.  
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a controlling definition.  See Walter E. Heller Western, Inc. v. 
Faires (In re Faires), 34 B.R. 549, 552 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1983). 
 Nantucket Investors argues that the term equity in 
section 362(d)(2) is ambiguous because equity is accorded a 
different meaning when the creditor's "equity cushion" is 
calculated in determining whether the creditor's interest is 
adequately protected under section 362(d)(1).  The text of 
section 362(d)(1), which governs relief from the automatic stay 
for good cause including lack of adequate protection, does not 
contain the term "equity."  However, in determining whether a 
secured creditor's interest is adequately protected, most courts 
engage in an analysis of the property's "equity cushion" -- the 
value of the property after deducting the claim of the creditor 
seeking relief from the automatic stay and all senior claims. 
See, e.g., In re Colonial Center, Inc., 156 B.R. 452, 459 (Bankr. 
E.D. Pa. 1993); La Jolla Mortg. Fund v. Rancho El Cajon Assocs., 
18 B.R. 283, 289 (Bankr. S.D. Calif. 1982).  Junior liens are 
disregarded for "equity cushion" analysis because the secured 
creditor is entitled to adequate protection only as to its claim; 
it may not claim protection for others.  La Jolla Mortgage Fund, 
18 B.R. at 289.  In contrast, all liens are considered in 
calculating the equity retained by the debtor under section 
362(d)(2), because the equity analysis in that section focuses on 
"the value, above all secured claims against the property, that 
can be realized from the sale of the property for the benefit of 
all unsecured creditors."  Pistole v. Mellor (In re Mellor), 734 
F.2d 1396, 1400 n.2 (9th Cir. 1984).  Thus, the analysis of the 
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creditor's "equity cushion" under section 362(d)(1) differs from 
a calculation of the debtor's equity under section 362(d)(2) and 
does not render the term "equity" ambiguous.  E.g., Mellor, 734 
F.2d at 1400 n.2 (noting that "equity cushion" differs from 
"equity" in that the former is concerned with the value of the 
property above the amount owed to the creditor with a secured 
claim and the latter is concerned with the value above all 
secured claims against the property); In re Colonial Ctr., Inc., 
156 B.R. 452, 459-60 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993); In re South County 
Realty, Inc. II, 69 B.R. 611, 614 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1987); In re 
Dunes Casino Hotel, 69 B.R. 784, 793-94 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986). 
 
C. 
 We recognize that some bankruptcy courts have rejected 
the standard definition of equity for purposes of section 
362(d)(2) analysis when junior lienholders protest the lifting of 
the automatic stay to permit foreclosure.  See Cote v. United 
Finance Co. (In re Cote), 27 B.R. 510, 513 (Bankr. D. Or. 1983); 
Asquino v. Palmer River Realty, Inc. (In re Palmer River Realty, 
Inc.), 26 B.R. 138, 140 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1983); Central Fla. Prod. 
Credit Assoc. v. Spring Garden Foliage, Inc. (In re Spring Garden 
Foliage, Inc.), 15 B.R. 140, 143 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981). 
Nantucket Investors urges us to adopt that rule, but we decline 
to do so. 
 We find no hint in the language or legislative history 
of section 362(d), and the interests balancing it incorporates, 
that authorizes excluding the junior lienholders' claims from the 
equity calculation when their interests diverge from the senior 
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lienholder's.0  As the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has 
explained: 
 
The language of the statute simply refers to 
the debtor's "equity," which has been defined 
as 'the amount or value of a property above 
the total liens or charges.'  The statute 
does not refer to the debtor's equity as 
against the only plaintiff-lienholder seeking 
to lift the stay or persons holding liens 
senior to that of the plaintiff-lienholder. 
The minority view improperly focuses upon the 
interests of junior lienholders . . . . 
Stewart v. Gurley, 745 F.2d at 1196 (quoting Walter E. Heller 
Western, Inc. v. Faires (In re Faires), 34 B.R. 549, 552 (Bankr. 
W.D. Wash. 1983)). 
 A definition of equity that requires consideration of 
all secured liens comports with the purpose of section 362(d)(2) 
analysis and strikes the proper balance among the secured 
creditors', the unsecured creditors', and the debtor's interests. 
The basic purpose behind Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code is to 
offer protection to the insolvent debtor who seeks rehabilitation 
through a plan of reorganization.  To the extent that property is 
of no benefit to the debtor, because the debtor retains no equity 
in it and the property is unnecessary to an effective 
reorganization, only the junior lienholders will benefit by 
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 To the extent we have located any legislative history 
that shines light on this issue, it appears that section 
362(d)(2)(A) was intended to protect a creditor's right to 
foreclosure.  In a joint explanatory statement prepared by the 
floor managers on the ultimately enacted compromise bill, it was 
noted that "section [362(d)(2)] is intended to solve the problem 
of real property mortgage foreclosures of property where the 
bankruptcy petition is filed on the eve of foreclosure."  124 
Cong. Rec. H11047, H11092-93; 124 Cong. Rec. S17403, S17409. 
Excluding the junior lienholders' claims when they oppose 
foreclosure would not further this intent. 
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avoiding foreclosure, at the expense of senior lienholders.  See 
Stewart v. Gurley, 745 F.2d at 1196 ("Unless the debtor can 
demonstrate that the property is necessary to an effective 
reorganization, the property is of no value to him.  Refusing to 
grant relief from the automatic stay under those circumstances 
would only promote the junior lienholders' interests over those 
of the senior lienholder."). 
 Furthermore, we note that the language of section 
362(d)(2) is mandatory, when both factors necessary for relief 
under section 362(d)(2) are met "the court shall grant relief." 
11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2).  Excluding the claims of objecting junior 
lienholders from the equity calculation when the subsection 
(d)(2) factors are otherwise met would thus contravene the plain 
language of that provision. 
 
D. 
 Our refusal to adopt Nantucket Investors' position does 
not prevent the bankruptcy court from otherwise considering the 
interests of objecting junior lienholders.  On the contrary, when 
a senior lienholder successfully petitions the bankruptcy court 
for relief from the automatic stay in order to proceed with a 
foreclosure action, junior lienholders may protect their 
interests by bidding at foreclosure in order to retain their 
secured interest in the property.  Additionally, it is 
appropriate for the bankruptcy court to consider the interests of 
junior lienholders in determining whether an effective 
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reorganization is possible without the encumbered property.  See 
In re Mellor, 734 F.2d at 1401; 2 Collier on Bankruptcy,  
§ 362.07[2], at 362-69 & n.15a (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 
1994).  Thus for example, in this case the bankruptcy court may 
properly consider the junior lienholders' subordination 
agreements in determining whether an effective reorganization is 
possible and whether the property is necessary to that end. 
Because we find that there are other means by which the 
bankruptcy court may consider the interests of junior lienholders 
in determining whether relief from the automatic stay is proper, 
we find no need to adopt a changeable definition of equity that 
excludes consideration of protesting junior lienholders' 
interests under certain circumstances.0 
 We will therefore reverse the district court insofar as 
it determined that the debtor has equity in the property, and 
will remand with instructions to return this matter to the 
bankruptcy court so that it may consider the second factor 
necessary for relief under section 362(d)(2), namely whether the 
property is necessary to an effective reorganization.0 
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 We reject Nantucket Investors' argument that its 
willingness to cede a portion of its secured claim to the debtor 
to defeat lifting of the stay under § 362(d)(2) should be 
considered in calculating the debtor's equity.  Nantucket 
Investors has not in fact ceded any portion of its claim to the 




 Under the proper equity calculation, the outstanding 
liens against the property exceed the current stipulated value of 




 A final note regarding relief under § 362(d)(2) is 
necessary in light of our remand order.  In a single-asset 
bankruptcy case like this one, the property will almost always be 
necessary for reorganization for the very reason that it is the 
debtor's sole asset, and relief under 362(d)(2)(B) will be 
available only if the bankruptcy court concludes that 
reorganization within a reasonable time is not feasible.  See 
United Savings Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest, 484 U.S. at 376 
(noting that the requirement that the property be "necessary to 
an effective reorganization" requires a showing that there is "a 
reasonable possibility of a successful reorganization within a 
reasonable time" (internal quotation omitted)); Ahlers v. Norwest 
Bank Worthington (In re Ahlers), 794 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 1986), 
rev'd on other grounds, 485 U.S. 197 (1988).  The bankruptcy 
court found that the debtor's fourth plan would not be 
confirmable under the Bankruptcy Code's cram down procedure,0 
because it extended the maturity date of CalFed's mortgage beyond 
its original term.  The district rejected the bankruptcy court's 
conclusion that there was any such per se rule.  We agree.  As 
the district court noted, the plain terms of the Bankruptcy Code 
refute the proposition that a plan may not extend the maturity 
date of a mortgage.  See 11 U.S.C.  
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 Where the debtor cannot secure the acceptance of all 
classes of impaired claims, the Bankruptcy Code permits the 
confirmation of a plan over the objections of impaired classes 
under certain conditions through a procedure known as a cram 
down.  11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10), (b). 
30 
§ 1123(a)(5) ("[A] plan [of reorganization] shall . . . provide 
adequate means for the plan's implementation, such as . . . 
modification of any lien; . . . extension of a maturity date or a 
change in an interest rate or other term of outstanding 
securities.").  There is no per se rule that a nonconsensual plan 
may not extend a secured lien beyond its original mortgage date. 
In re Crane Automotive, Inc., 88 B.R. 81, 83 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 
1988); In re Martin, 66 B.R. 921, 930 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1986); In 
re Hollanger, 15 B.R. 35, 46-47 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1981). Therefore 
on considering whether relief from the stay is warranted under 
section 362(d)(2), the bankruptcy court may not find that 
reorganization is precluded as a matter of law solely because a 
proposed plan extends the maturity date on CalFed's mortgage. 
 
VI. 
 As noted, CalFed also sought relief from the automatic 
stay under section 362(d)(1) on the ground its claim was not 
adequately protected.  The bankruptcy court granted relief on 
this ground and the district court reversed.  On appeal, CalFed 
maintains that the district court engaged in impermissible fact 
finding in determining that the current value of its claim is 
less than the current stipulated value of the property, and that 
its claim is adequately protected by the remaining "equity 
cushion."0   
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 Under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a), the district court sits as an 
appellate court and is not authorized to engage in independent 
fact finding.  Indeed, under the appropriate standards of review, 
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 Central to the determination of adequate protection in 
this case is the proper allocation of approximately $1.1 million 
in post-petition payments made by the debtor to CalFed.  Although 
the bankruptcy court did not make a specific finding regarding 
the allocation of the post-petition payments, in finding that the 
current value of CalFed's claim was approximately $4.5 million 
(the same as the value of its claim when the bankruptcy petition 
was filed), the bankruptcy court must have allocated all of the 
post-petition payments to interest rather than to payments 
reducing the underlying debt.0  The district court, relying on 
the evidence adduced during the bankruptcy hearing, concluded 
that such an allocation was improper as a matter of law since, 
under the guiding legal principles, interest can accrue post-
petition only to the extent that a creditor's secured claim 
exceeds the value of the property securing it.  See 11 U.S.C.  
§ 506(b); Timbers, 384 U.S. at 372-73.  Thus, the district court 
concluded that because, as of the petition date, CalFed's claim 
exceeded the estimated value petition date value of the property 
(less the estimated value of the tax lien) by only approximately 
$145,000, the bulk of the post-petition payments had to be 
allocated to payments on the principal debt, reducing the current 
value of CalFed's claim to a figure approximately $700,000 less 
than the current stipulated value of the property, and leaving 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the district court reviews the bankruptcy court's findings in a 
core proceeding only for clear error.  Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8013.   
0
 The basis for the bankruptcy court's conclusion that 
CalFed's claim had not been reduced by the $1.1 million post-
petition payments is not entirely clear.  See supra note 5. 
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CalFed's claim adequately protected against further erosion in 
the value of the property.  CalFed maintains that after 
determining that the debtor and Nantucket Investors had not 
conceded that interest had accrued post-petition to the full 
extent of the post-petition payments, the district court should 
have remanded the issue to the bankruptcy court so that it could 
consider all relevant factors pertaining to the allocation of the 
post-petition payments, and could then determine the actual value 
of CalFed's current claim and whether its claim was adequately 
protected. 
 The heart of CalFed's argument is that one relevant 
factor that the bankruptcy and district courts have not yet 
considered is whether the assignment of rents gave CalFed a lien 
on the property's rental income when the bankruptcy petition was 
filed.  CalFed maintains that if it had such an interest, the 
value of the collateral securing its claim would have been the 
sum of the petition date value of the property plus the present 
value of the future rental income, and that its claim would have 
been "oversecured" by an amount greater than the $145,000 figure 
used by the district court to determine under Timbers how much 
post-petition interest could have accrued.  CalFed asserts that 
the district court's determination that the current stipulated 
value of the property exceeds the value of CalFed's current claim 
by nearly $700,000, and its conclusion that CalFed was thus 
adequately protected, therefore rested on an incomplete set of 
facts.  We disagree. 
33 
 In the papers accompanying its motion for relief from 
the stay, CalFed asserted that its claim on the date the 
bankruptcy petition was filed was approximately $4.5 million, and 
that since the petition date, the amount outstanding under the 
note and mortgage had grown by approximately $1.59 million, 
including approximately $1.49 million in post-petition interest. 
App. 6 (declaration of bank vice-president).  However, neither in 
its moving papers nor its accompanying brief did CalFed assert a 
legal basis for the accrual of this much post-petition interest.0 
 The allocation of the post-petition payments became a 
contested issue at the hearing before the bankruptcy court. 
Indeed, the bankruptcy court noted that the proper allocation of 
these payments would likely determine whether CalFed's interest 
was adequately protected.  As the hearing transcript 
demonstrates, however, the parties presented only two theories 
that would support the allocation of post-petition payments to 
something other than a reduction of the principal debt: CalFed's 
unsupported assertion that the payments may have been in the 
nature of adequate protection payments,0 and the debtor's 
contention that interest could have accrued post-petition only to 
the extent that CalFed's claim exceeded the value of the property 
                                                           
0
 CalFed's lack of adequate protection argument rested on 
the property's decline in value since the bankruptcy filing and 
the debtor's failure to propose a confirmable plan since that 
time. 
0
        See 11 U.S.C. § 361(1). 
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as of the petition date, less the petition date value of the tax 
lien.0 
                                                           
0
 Mr. Kitzel argued on behalf of CalFed.  Mr. Bauer 
represented the debtor and Mr. Higgens represented Nantucket 
Investors. 
 
 THE COURT:  Does the Debtor concede that 
interest accrued during the [Chapter] 11 or 
not? 
 
 MR. BAUER:  No, your Honor.  We do not 
concede. . . . 
 
 . . . . 
 
 THE COURT:  One of the dispositive 
issues is going to be the amount of the 
short-fall.  And so, therefore, we need to 
peg a value, and we need to peg what your 
pay-off figure is. 
 
 I mean, the Debtor made substantial 
payments in the [Chapter] 11 of over a 
million dollars.  The question is, was there, 
also, the post-petition interest accrual of a 
million four [as CalFed asserted in the 
declaration of bank vice president Koehler 
which accompanied its motion]. 
 
. . . If interest continued to accrue, your 
debt increased by a half million. 
 
 If interest didn't accrue, and the 
Debtor tendered over a million dollars in 
payments, your balance [owing to CalFed] may 
be . . . substantially less than what it was 
when you filed.  So, I mean, it becomes very 
critical as to whether interest continued to 
accrue or not under the Timbers case. 
 
 MR. KITZEL:  Your Honor, the payment of 
the million dollars also is in the form of 




                                                                                                                                                                                           
. . .I believe that that's the reason why --
the value of the property was decreasing, the 
payments . . . were made. 
 
 THE COURT:  Well, what shows that in the 
record?  Is there an order that memorializes 
that? 
 
 MR. BAUER:  There is no cash collateral 
order.  There's nothing that says that it was 
adequate protection payment.  We paid them a 
million dollars during the course of this 
case, in excess of a million.  That should be 
implied [sic] to the aggregate indebtedness 
owing to CalFed. . . . There is nothing that 
states it should be applied to interest. 
 
 . . . . 
 
 THE COURT:  Wait.  What does CalFed say 
the property was worth on the day the Chapter 
11 was filed?  Isn't that what Timbers tells 
us?  We have to look and see if you were over 
collateralized or under collateralized on the 
date of the filing to determine whether 




 Following a discussion of the evidence regarding the 
value of the property as of the petition filing date the debtor 
conceded that the value of the property at that time was "in the 
ballpark" of $4.5 to $4.6 million.  App. 333.  CalFed had 
previously asserted that its claim on the petition date was 
approximately $4.5 million.  App. 331.  The discussion of the 
accrual of post-petition interest continued: 
 
 THE COURT:  All right.  So, therefore, 
interest accrued; right?. . . . 
 
 MR. BAUER:  Only to the value of the 
property it could have accrued to. 
 
 It couldn't accrue in excess of the 
value of the property. . . . 
 
 . . . . 
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 Significantly, neither before the bankruptcy court nor 
in response to Nantucket Investors' appeal to the district court 
did CalFed raise its potential interest in the rental stream to 
explain how interest could have accrued beyond the extent of 
CalFed's facial oversecurity.  CalFed presented this argument for 
the first time in connection with its motion for relief from the 
stay when it sought reconsideration from the district court 
following that court's reversal of the bankruptcy court's 
conclusion that CalFed was not adequately protected.0  On appeal 
to this court, it maintains that "[t]he rental income stream was 
the source of the post-petition payments." Appellant's Amended 
Brief at 35.  However, for purposes of its motion for relief from 
the stay, CalFed has posited its rental stream theory too late. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 There's also another piece of this 
puzzle that's missing, and that is, at the 
outset of this case, when it was filed, there 
were tax arrearages of approximately 
$300,000. 
 
 . . . . 
 
 If we're looking to see what they're 
entitled to by way of accruing interest, then 
that $300,000, which was a jump-ahead lien, 
has to be factored into the scenario. 
 
App. 333-34.  CalFed responded by arguing that a recent letter 
from the debtor to the bank's representative admitting that the 
property "has greatly deteriorated over the past few years" 
established a prima facie case that CalFed's interest was not 
adequately protected.  App. 335-37. 
0
 CalFed had asserted an interest in the rental income in 
a 1991 motion in which it sought relief from the automatic stay 
and to prohibit the debtor from using cash collateral in the form 
of rents, which motion it withdrew upon consenting to the 
debtor's second proposed plan of reorganization. 
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 "Ordinarily, an appeals court will not consider issues 
not raised in the court below."0  Trailways Lines, Inc. v. 
Trailways, Inc. Joint Council of Amalgamated Transit Union, 785 
F.2d 101, 104 n.2 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.s. 932 (1986). 
Having failed to raise its rental stream theory as a basis for 
allocating the post-petition payments to interest payments during 
the fact finding hearing before the bankruptcy court, CalFed has 
waived the argument that it has a lien on the rental income of 
the property for purposes of this motion for relief from the 
automatic stay.  CalFed is therefore precluded from submitting 
new evidence on remand to establish the petition date value of 
its claim, other than within the parameters set forth by the 
district court.0  Whether CalFed will be estopped from asserting 
an interest in the rental stream during other proceedings in this 
Chapter 11 case will depend on the application of principles of 
res judicata, collateral estoppel, and law of the case as they 
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 Although an exception to this rule permits appellate 
review of an issue not raised in the trial court to serve the 
interests of justice, Trailways Lines, Inc., 785 F.2d at 104 n.2, 
the grounds for this exception are not met in this case. 
0
 The district court carefully noted that certain 
relevant facts were not definitively established by the evidence 
before the bankruptcy court, including the petition date value of 
the tax lien and the petition date value of the property.  Thus, 
the district court noted that on remand, the bankruptcy court 
could calculate these actual values in determining the precise 
amount of CalFed's "equity cushion."  However, in light of the 
range in which these values would fall (based on the record 
evidence before it) the district court noted that the precise 
calculations would not have a legal effect on its conclusion that 
CalFed's claim was adequately protected by a significant equity 
cushion. 
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apply in bankruptcy proceedings.0 We express no view on that 
issue.  The only issue currently before us is the effect CalFed's 
failure to raise its interest in the rental income has on the 
disposition of its present motion to lift the automatic stay. 
 The district court did not engage in independent fact 
finding.  The court simply applied the law -- that interest can 
accrue post-petition only to the extent the value of the 
collateral securing a creditor's claim exceeds the petition date 
value of its claim -- to the record developed before the 
bankruptcy court.  The only disputed facts regarding the 
allocation of the post-petition payments concerned the actual 
petition date value of the property and the actual petition date 
value of the tax lien, facts that the district court properly 
declined to ascertain. 
 
VII. 
 We reverse the district court's determination that the 
debtor has equity in the property within the meaning of section 
362(d)(2)(A) and remand with instructions to return this matter 
to the bankruptcy court so that it may determine whether the 
property is necessary to an effective reorganization, and thus 
whether relief from the automatic stay may be granted under 
section 362(d)(2).  We affirm the district court's order in all 
other respects. 
 
                                                           
0
 See generally Hon. Barry Russell, Bankruptcy Evidence 
Manual, §§ 1-40 (1994). 
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ROTH, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissent




 Although I concur with the majority in Parts I-III, V 
and VI of their opinion, I cannot agree with their conclusion in 
Part IV that the debtor did not retain equity in the property.  I 
must therefore respectfully dissent from the reversal of the 
district court's determination in that regard. 
 The majority adopts the "classic test" for determining 
equity under § 362(d)(2):  subtracting the value of all the 
secured liens on the property from the property's current value. 
They reject the district court's exclusion  of the junior secured 
claims of Nantucket and FEC from the subtrahend of the 
calculation.  However, if junior lienholders are willing to 
concede their secured position in such a way that the senior 
lienholder's interest is protected, the debtor may have actual, 
if not literal, equity in the property.  I see no reason why that 
concession should not be permitted and "equity" be defined in a 
reorganization by the balance, reached by subtracting the 
security of concerned lienholders from the value of the property, 
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rather than from a calculation of figures that do not represent 
the reality of the commercial situation. 
 Nantucket urges the court to adopt the district court's 
reasoning that, pursuant to the Fourth Amended Plan, the junior 
lienholders effectively granted the Debtor a portion of their 
equity in the Property by subordinating part of their secured 
claims.  I agree that such an interpretation of "equity" is 
reasonable and could permit a Chapter 11 reorganization to 
succeed in a situation where the junior lienholders were willing 
to step back, at least in part, from their secured positions. For 
example, in a single asset reorganization, junior lienholders may 
face the eradication of their interest in the debtor's property 
if a plan of reorganization cannot be developed.  Their 
willingness to cooperate to save their own interest may be the 
factor which will permit the reorganization to succeed.   
 Adherents of the majority's interpretation of "equity" 
have criticized the subtraction of the amounts owed to junior 
lienholders from a determination of equity as "improperly 
focus[ing] upon the interests of junior lienholders as opposed to 
the interests of the debtor or senior lienholder."  Stewart v. 
Gurley, 745 F.2d 1194, 1196 (9th Cir. 1984).  The concern is that 
the interests of the junior lienholders will be promoted over 
those of the senior lienholder.  Id.  However, if the property is 
necessary to the reorganization and if the senior lienholder is 
adequately protected, it makes very good sense to me in a 
§362(d)(2)(A) calculation to credit the interests of the junior 
lienholders to equity.  I would urge that we do so. 
3 
 In the present case, the district court found that if 
it were to uphold the bankruptcy court's grant of a stay, "the 
claims of both the Debtor and its affiliate FEC, along with the 
objecting lienholder Nantucket and all of the unsecured creditors 
[would] be wiped out."  In re:  Indian Palms Associates, Ltd. No. 
93-4519, slip op. at 13 (D.N.J. Feb. 8, 1994).  That consequence 
surely accounts for Nantucket and FEC's concessions in the Fourth 
Amended Plan.  If the junior lienholders are willing to make 
concessions, I can see no reason why they should not be permitted 
to subordinate or restructure their liens so that the senior 
lienholder is protected and the reorganization may then go 
through. 
 Moreover, as the district court stated, by recognizing 
the junior lienholders' concessions and finding that they gave 
the debtor equity in the property, the court would further "the 
objectives of the Bankruptcy Code of both preserving the liens of 
the secured creditors and, to the extent feasible, adopting plans 
which will protect the interests of junior lienholders, unsecured 
creditors and equity holders."  Id. at 15. 
 Although they are in the minority, other courts have 
seen the logic of calculating "equity" without deducting the 
liens of junior lienholders who are willing to cooperate with the 
debtor.  See, e.g., In re Palmer River Realty, Inc., 26 B.R. 138, 
139-40 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1983) (in calculating equity under 
§362(d)(2)(A), second mortgage had no relevance to question of 
equity where second mortgagee expressed desire to support 
reorganization attempt; "second mortgage should not be considered 
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in determining whether there is an equity cushion in the subject 
property."). 
 The majority also cites as a reason for adopting its 
construction of § 362(d) the "mandatory" language of the section: 
"the court shall grant relief from the stay".  [Typescript at 27] 
Inherent in this reading of the statute is the interpretation of 
"equity" in the "classic" manner as was done by the majority. If, 
however, we were to interpret "equity" as we suggest above, the 
elements of subsection (d)(2)(A) might not be satisfied and the 
mandatory language would not then be triggered.    
 Moreover, the majority stops its reading of § 362(d) 
too soon.  The section goes on to provide that the form of relief 
granted may be "such as by terminating, annulling, modifying, or 
conditioning such stay--".  The fact that the relief requested of 
the bankruptcy court is termination does not preclude the court 
from granting other relief:  for example, relief which will 
condition the continuation of the stay on concessions by the 
junior lienholders.  A leading bankruptcy commentator agrees that 
this statutory language should be construed flexibly: 
 The flexibility of section 362 is 
underscored by the language of subsection (d) 
which provides that relief may be granted by 
"terminating, annulling, modifying, or 
conditioning" the stay.  The effect is to 
permit the court to fashion the relief to the 
particular circumstances of the case.  Thus 
modification or conditioning of the stay may 
be sufficient to protect the non debtor party 
by permitting the exercise of certain but not 
all of its rights. 
2 Collier on Bankruptcy, § 362.07, at 362-64 (Lawrence P. King 
ed., 15th ed. 1994).  
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 Finally, the majority comments that the junior 
lienholders here may be protected by demonstrating to the 
bankruptcy court that the property is necessary to an effective 
reorganization.  I am unwilling, however, to rely on this element 
of subsection (d)(2)(B) for ensuring a remedy for a junior 
lienholder, such as Nantucket.  There is the possibility for too 
much interplay between subsections (A) and (B) of § 362(d)(2).  I 
can envision a scenario in which consideration of the 
requirements of subsections (A) and (B) are conflated into one 
exercise:  the bankruptcy court finds a reorganization would not 
be possible because of the debtor's lack of classically construed 
"equity" in the property and decides to grant relief from the 
stay; the bankruptcy court would not then go on, as the majority 
discusses here, to consider whether the property was necessary 
for an effective reorganization and subsection (B) would not be 
available, in what might otherwise be a successful 
reorganization, to protect the interests of the junior 
lienholders.   
 For all the above reasons, I conclude that the language 
of § 362(d)(2) does not require the majority's "classic" 
interpretation of equity.  I am persuaded instead that the 
interests of the Bankruptcy Code in protecting all lienholders 
should permit junior lienholders to concede their security in 
order to create equity for the debtor and to permit a 
reorganization to go forward where, lacking that concession, it 
would not.   
